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The five West African states making up the G5 Sahel rely on foreign contributions to 
support the nascent regional organization. In February 2018, the European Union (EU) and Saudi 
Arabia were the top contributors to the G5, each pledging 100 million euros. The investment 
from the EU builds upon previous agreements and missions for regional development and 
security. The equal contribution from Saudi Arabia is unprecedented. The partnership with the 
Sahel G5 emerged about the same time as another Saudi Arabian initiative, the Islamic Military 
Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC). The IMCTC serves as the construct for the G5 Sahel 
partnership. Another relevant actor and investor with the IMCTC is the United Arab Emirates, 
contributing 30 million euros to the G5, and backing Saudi regional plans. The emergence of a 
new regional power acting in the Sahel motivated a comparison study with the EU. The research 
question will answer which external partner(s), the European Union, or SA with the UAE, is 
more influential over the political, economic and security goals and activities of the G5 
Sahel.  To determine the effect of EU, Saudi and UAE investment in the G5 Sahel this thesis will 
include a review of the respective partnerships and the comparison of a series of indicators to 
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 The Sahel is a land of transition. Geographically, it is the transition from the Sahara Desert 
to the savanna and forests of sub-Saharan Africa. The populations that live there are also in 
transition. They are tribally affiliated and move with herds of livestock and caravans of goods. The 
zone is arid and vulnerable to desertification. Culturally, the region shares a common history of 
Arabization and French colonialization in the central and western Sahel. The artificial borders 
created during colonialization remain porous. Sahelian states are underdeveloped with weak 
democracies, underemployed youth, and ungoverned territory creating safe havens for illicit 
activity. Consequently, the Sahel is a tumultuous region, rife with militant groups, drug, human 
and arms trafficking. The compilation of conflict in Libya to the north, the Tuareg rebellion in 
Mali, and Boko Haram encroaching on the Lake Chad Basin, coupled with environmental 
pressures, make the Sahel a lightning rod for instability.   
In light of the commonalities shared by states of the Sahel, the G5 Sahel political regional 
organization formed to address issues of transnational insecurity and development challenges. 
Established in 2014, it is made up of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. The 
organizational goals all address insecurity or development, or more accurately human development 
to address insecurity challenges. The organization groups activities into the following categories: 
security and defense, governance, infrastructure and resilience. In 2017, the G5 Sahel security 
force became operational with the political backing of international organizations. The African 
Union Peace and Security Council approved the implementation of a regional Sahel security force 





international concurrence and legitimacy.1 The three on-going security missions are all trans-
border, operating across the territory of each G5 member state. They function as a counter-
terrorism force and work in conjunction with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French Sahelian Operation Barkhane. The capabilities of 
the G5 Sahel are limited by the strained resources of the member states and their competing 
priorities. 
 The international community applauds the G5 Sahel as an independent African regional 
organization to address regional concerns. However, the G5 Sahel as an independent regional body 
is far from the reality. All planning and operational functions rely on external funding, and there 
is no shortage of international interest in the Sahel. The Arab Gulf States, China, the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU) all have increasing presence. The Arab Gulf states invest in 
social capital, supporting religious and educational enterprises. China is interested in raw resources 
and foreign direct investment through bilateral agreements. The US since 2001, invests in security 
and counter-terrorism partnerships. The EU is likewise concerned with insecurity and the 
destabilizing effects of migration. Apart from China, all fund the initiative of the G5 Sahel. The 
most substantial international investors include France, the EU, Saudi Arabia (SA), the US and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE).2  
The dependence of the G5 Sahel on foreign funding, puts these actors forefront in relations 
with the nascent regional organization. The EU and SA are the top contributors, they have the most 
                                                          
1 Zoë Gorman and Dr Grégory Chauzal, “Establishing a regional security architecture in the Sahel”, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (2018). Accessed 13 July 2018 at  https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-
backgrounder/2018/establishing-regional-security-architecture-sahel. 
 
2 At the Brussels Conference in February 2018 the EU and SA both pledged 100 million euros, the US pledged 60 
million dollars, and the UAE 30 million euros. 







at stake financially if not politically, in the success of the G5 Sahel. Although the US also invested, 
it is more interested in continuing bilateral military partnerships than further involvement with the 
G5.3 The UAE aligns with the geostrategic position of SA concerning the Sahel. Qatar is another 
Gulf state that is active in the region, but it diverges from the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in its relations with the Sahel. Qatar’s support of militant groups branded as terrorist 
organizations in Mali, is a reason for the recent rupture with the UAE and SA.4 The remaining 
international players strongly behind the G5 are the EU, SA and the UAE. This study will measure 
and compare the influence of these primary investors.  The research question is which external 
partner(s), the European Union, or SA with the UAE, is more influential over the political, 
economic and security goals and activities of the G5 Sahel?  To determine the effect of EU, Saudi 
and UAE investment in the G5 Sahel, this thesis will include a review of the respective partnerships 
and a comparison of a series of indicators to determine which partner, and to what extent they 
influence the region.   
The results of this study seek to explain the political, economic and security alignment of 
the G5 Sahel. Alignment refers to coherence in goals and activities between the G5 Sahel and the 
three chosen external partners. The following section will include a brief background of 
international relations between the chosen actors including the context of the Saudi and the UAE 
partnership with the Sahelian states since the 1980s, and the EU’s increasing involvement in the 
wake of the migration crisis. The background will inform why the selected partners make for a 
telling comparison. Following the background will be the methodology. The methodology will 
                                                          
3 “EU doubles funds for G5 Sahel military anti-terror security force”, Deutsche Welle, (2018), doi: 
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-doubles-funds-for-g5-sahel-military-anti-terror-security-force/a-42711948. 
 
4 Haim Malka “Maghreb Neutrality: Maghreb-Gulf Arab Ties Since the GCC Split”, Center for Strategic and 







explain the choice of indicators, how they will be compared, and how influence will be ultimately 
assessed. Next, will be the analysis of indicators in the three categories of influence. The data will 
determine the existence and degree of influence.  The analysis and comparison of external partners 
with the G5 make this thesis research relevant to current international relations in this strategic 
geopolitical region. Understanding the level of real influence by the most invested players, can 
provide insight to the current and future alignment of the G5 Sahel. 
 
Background 
The many acronyms associated with the organizations and initiatives active in the Sahel 
and relevant to this study, are organized by actor and the sector in which they engage in charts in 
the Appendix for reference. Prior to the creation of the G5, political-economic unions created a 
space of interdependence with integrated markets in Central and West Africa. The Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) include Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Chad is part of the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU). 5 The WAEMU and CAEMU dating from the 1960s, 
created a precedence for regional coordination dependent on external backing.  ECOWAS has a 
secondary function in multilateral cooperation as the “regional gendarme” assisting in 
mediations and peace operations.6  In Mali, it was ECOWAS that started the multinational 
peacekeeping mission after the French intervention. The ECOWAS peacekeeping mission 
ultimately failed. The accords signed were not respected, and member states did not work well 
                                                          
5 Gerard Clément, Pierre Roquet and Dominique Jambard, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, du  
     Proche et du Moyen-Orient, (France, Bréal, 2014), 49.  
 






together, each defending separate interests.7 The failings of ECOWAS at regional cooperation 
hastened the creation of the G5 Sahel.  
The organization is intergovernmental, with heads of state directly engaged. It formed in 
Nouakchott, Mauritania at a summit with the executive leaders from the five states.8 Multiple 
crises spurred its formation in the absence of an accepted regional body to respond. From the 
north, the eruption of conflict and disorder in Libya sent arms and experienced militants into 
northern Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel, facilitating the Tuareg rebellion and arrival of Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali in 2013. From the south is the Boko Haram 
conflict spilling over from Nigeria into the Lake Chad Basin. Transnational trafficking is a 
source of funding for subnational militants perpetuating conflict. The lack of a peaceful 
resolution in Mali, and the efforts by Chadian and Nigerien militaries to contain Boko Haram, 
motivated requests by Sahelian states for foreign support. Likewise, foreign powers wanted to 
intervene to prevent spillover of conflict, the second-order effects of instability, and also to serve 
their own geostrategic interests.9 
 The very existence of the organization is an ironic juxtaposition of regional autonomy 
and external dependence. Included in its mandate is coordination with the efforts of existing 
international organizations, including the UN, EU, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
                                                          
7 Edgard Kpatindé, “Quel rôle pour les institutions africaines (CEDEAO et UA)” in Menaces en Afrique du Nord et 
au Sahel et sécurité globale de l’Europe, eds. Jacques Frémeaux, Philippe Evanno and Aymeric Chauprade (Paris, 
Sorbonne, 2013), 111. 
 
8 Nicholas Desgrais, “La Force conjointe du G5 Sahel ou l'émergence d'une architecture de défense collective propre 
au Sahel”, Les Champs de Mars 30, no. 1 (2018), 213, doi : https://www-cairn-info.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/revue-les-
champs-de-mars-2018-1-page-211.htm. 
 
9 Mehdi Taje, “Le défi fondamentaliste en Afrique du Nord et dans le Sahara”, in Menaces en Afrique du Nord et au 
Sahel et sécurité globale de l’Europe, eds. Jacques Frémeaux, Philippe Evanno and Aymeric Chauprade (Paris, 






African Union, and ECOWAS.10 While at the same time, their first objective is “to preserve the 
territorial integrity of its states and to lead.”11 In 2017, the creation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force 
(FC-G5S) overshadowed any development initiatives. The Force’s first mission occurred in 
November 2017 operating across the borders of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. The FC-G5S is 
small, split over three geographic zones and equaling about 4,550 soldiers.12 By comparison, the 
French had 9,000 soldiers deployed in the Sahel in 2014.13  
The FC-G5S is strained for many reasons. First, the member states already commit forces 
to the MINUSMA mission in northern Mali, and Chad and Niger support operations against 
Boko Haram with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Second, there is political 
competition from rival organizations, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the 
Nouakchott Process which includes the Sahel states.14  The G5 has limited internal resources. 
Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad rank within the five lowest states in the world as determined by 
the UN Development Program’s Human Development Index. Another challenge is the great 
expanse of territory.  The Sahel is under-governed, and borders are difficult to secure.  In 
addition, harsh desert conditions and weak state logistics hinder sustained surveillance. 
Therefore, the G5 is in a difficult position, it cannot function autonomously and to function must 
work with foreign partners with professed similar motives.   
                                                          
10 Desgrais, 213. 
 
11 Final Communiqué from the Summit of the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel, “Création d’un cadre institutionnel de 
coordination et de suivi de la coopération régionale”, (Nouakchott, 2014). 
 
12 International Crisis Group, “Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force”, AFRICA 258 (Brussels/Dakar, 
2017), 7. 
 
13 Philippe Hugon, Géopolitique de l’Afrique, (Paris, Armand-Colin, 2016), 102. 
 





The Arab Gulf states have deep roots and a growing footprint in the Sahel. Due to early 
Arabization, the Arabian Gulf shares a cultural connection with North Africa and the Sahel. 
Additionally, SA considers the region within its sphere of influence. Since the 1980s, SA 
expanded its influence in the Sahel with the Islamic Development Bank a Saudi creation 
supported by the Saudi King, and the formation of sponsored non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) promoting religious education proselytizing Wahhabism, in which the UAE and Qatar 
are also active.15 The timing with the region’s post-colonial political reorientation beyond 
Europe, hastened a welcoming of Gulf investment. Besides SA and the UAE, other GCC 
member states have a presence in the Sahel, but there is no common regional foreign policy 
towards the region. The UAE is another substantial player, both in funding the G5, and in its 
similar social and economic investments to member states. SA and the UAE’s stated objectives 
and supported programs, along with their actions within the member states of the Sahel, will 
provide a fuller picture of their involvement and influence after the evaluation of political, 
security and economic indicators.  
For the Sahel, Europe and predominately France is the most present external partner since 
independence. The EU participates in the Sahel to counter terrorism, curb arms trafficking from 
Libya, stop the movement of drugs to Europe, counter migration to Europe, maintain ease of trade 
for natural resources, and counter US influence.16 Before their commitment to the G5 Sahel, 
Europe was already the highest contributor for development aid. 17  The 2007 EU Strategy for 
                                                          
15 Osman Antwi‐Boateng, “The Rise of Pan‐Islamic Terrorism in Africa: A Global Security Challenge”, in Politics 
and Policy 45, no. 2 (2017), 268. 
 
16 Christophe Réveillard “Le rôle de l’union européenne face aux défis géopolitiques sahéliens.  Le caractère 
ontologique de son impuissance”, Menaces en Afrique du Nord et au Sahel et sécurité globale de l’Europe eds. 
Jacques Frémeaux, Philippe Evanno and Aymeric Chauprade, (Paris, Sorbonne, 2013), 104. 
 






Africa broadened European interests beyond development and trade to include security and 
governance. The Strategy includes a three-part support plan to the G5 Sahel to include political 
partnership with dialogue between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Sahelian 
foreign ministers, development assistance with a substantial amount committed to reversing 
irregular migration, and security support with the three Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) missions.18 The EU through the EEAS intervenes multilaterally, with a soft power 
approach that has a political, economic and security impact. 
 
Methodology 
Influence is difficult to ascertain concretely and even more difficult to prove. There will 
always be unknown variables, whether they are motivations, pressures or personality dynamics of 
the actors involved. The combination of visible and invisible motives for an action or decision 
make labeling any one causal factor unrealistic. For that reason, this research measures and 
compares perceivable indicators that can yield influence with political, economic or security aims. 
It is admittedly not all inclusive and cannot provide a formula explaining actual influence exerted 
by an external actor. What the indicators offer are plausible, comparable explanations for external 
influence on the G5 Sahel.  The compiled data will provide a picture of professed support and 
objectives (political), tangible or pledged material support (economic), and hard power initiatives 
through training and coordinated missions (security). The analysis of influence indicators will 
show how the EU, SA and the UAE use soft or hard power in their relations with the G5 Sahel, 
and to what extent. The indicators represent different elements of potential influence in the 
political, economic and security sectors.  
                                                          
18 European Commission, “The EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries” European Commission: Press Release 





To start with, overt political influence manifests through published organizational or 
national objectives, international relations policies, and legal frameworks for intervention. It is 
visible through official diplomatic communiqués and public statements. In order to choose 
indicators that are measurable, comparable and reliable, this study uses data from academic 
sources, and official press releases covering governmental conferences that document 
commitments for engagement, organizational constructs, and actual agreements between the EU, 
SA, and the UAE with the G5 Sahel. If published objectives align with those of the G5 Sahel it 
implies either common interests, or the possible orientation of the G5 towards the objectives of a 
key partner. Additionally, if actions correspond with published objectives, then there is a 
consistency that builds the political credibility of the organization. A table will facilitate 
comparison of stated objectives, showing congruence or incongruence across key focus areas of 
the G5 Sahel. What the objectives for the Sahel are expected to show are the goals of the three 
external partners for the G5 Sahel, and the timing of the established objectives. If they published 
their objectives before the G5 Sahel and they correspond, then there is a potential to influence 
the political goals of the regional organization.  
The amount of financial support, trade and investment may not equate to influence, but it 
does show the level of interdependence or dependence that can become a leverage factor 
impacting the G5.  The economic indicators include direct funding of the G5 Sahel, bilateral 
funding to G5 member states, and also trade contributions and development aid. The importance 
of funding to the G5 is obvious, as it relies on foreign funding of operational costs. Yet, bilateral 
contributions are also important because G5 heads of state commit to and lead the organization.  
If there is a strong bilateral partnership with the EU, SA or the UAE, that can weigh in on the 





development projects are therefore important. NGOs and private enterprises can also have state 
funding or support state functions, especially in the Gulf states.   
The data relies on EU reported trade figures, economic commitments and program 
spending in the Sahel. Data for SA and the UAE comes from public statements, government 
sources and development agencies allied with the two Gulf states. The analysis will compare 
total financial contributions by the EU, SA and the UAE to the G5 Sahel and its members. It will 
also look at which sectors are funded, and whether the economic exchange is short or long term. 
Long term investments and trade deals, the funding of essential G5 operations, and essential state 
functions have the most potential to influence. Long term investments and trade deals indicate an 
enduring partnership and interdependence. The funding of essential G5 operations, makes the 
foreign contributions a necessity to the organization. Supporting member state functions is a 
competing priority because of the role of heads of state.  The economic data will be compiled 
into a table showing financial contributions by type including development aid, loan assistance 
and G5 Sahel regional support for the three external partners to provide as complete a picture of 
donor economic activity as possible. Accompanying charts will allow for a visual comparison.  
The security capabilities of the G5 Sahel, the FC-G5S, are recently rapidly expanding, 
which has several implications. If the FC-G5S becomes a primary security provider in the region, 
G5 member states will need continued support from their external partners and their influence can 
grow. For the perspective of external partners there is a motive to influence for security purposes.  
The EU intends to transition active EU missions to the FC-G5S, and in that case, the EU would 
come to rely on the Force to bolster regional stability. SA and the UAE through its security 
partnership IMCTC, use operations in the Sahel with the FC-G5S as their first publicized initiative 





actors, joint operations, equipment provided, and military and police presence by SA, the UAE 
and EU. The training indicator will look at the scope and longevity of the training missions. If 
there is participation in joint operations, both combat and advise and assist missions are important 
indicators. Combat operations show greater investment and involvement. However, advise and 
assist missions present an opportunity to influence the focus and abilities of the security force. If 
equipment greatly advances the capabilities of the FC-G5S that can also be a reason for influence. 
Military and police presence expresses a level of commitment by external partners. What the 
analysis of the security indicators will provide is a description of the ways external partners are 
supporting security capabilities of the FC-G5S to determine if they fulfill their security interests, 
bolster their position in the region, or create a dependence of G5 member states on the FC-G5S for 
their security.  
 
Influence Indicators: Data Comparison and Analysis 
Political Indicators 
 The stated objectives of the G5 Sahel and of external partners’ involvement in the Sahel, 
are general and altruistic. However, they are worth considering and comparing because they 
show where the focus differs, including the exclusion of certain G5 functions.  Where the 
language is similar there is an alignment of stated political goals which could be the result of 
external influence.  Table 1 in this section displays the published objectives of the three external 
partners for the Sahel and compares them with the organizational goals of the G5. Objectives 
alone can be empty, political relevance depends on the actors’ commitments and actions 
supporting their objectives, evidence of which is an indication for influence. The reaction of the 





change in diplomatic relations. The political indicators are organized by actor: G5, EU, SA and 
the UAE.  
To start with the G5, the G5 Sahel Convention signed by member states in 2014 lists the 
following: to guarantee conditions for development and security of member states; offer strategic 
leadership intervention in order to improve life conditions of civil populations; the alliance of 
development and security, supported by democracy and good governance for regional 
cooperation and mutual international benefit; and promote inclusive and durable regional 
development.19 The Permanent Secretariat has four departments that address the stated objectives 
which are security and defense, governance expertise, infrastructure, and resilience. 20 The 
organizational construct shows consistency between published principles and the functioning 
organs of the organization. The Defense and Security Department lists Operation Barkhane as a 
partner, indicating the importance of external partners and coordinating foreign military 
operations.21 
Notably, the official G5 Sahel website acknowledges the EU as the sponsor of the site, 
whether that is acknowledging financial and technical support for the site or content is unclear. 
The Permanent Secretariat publishes a biannual review titled “Sécurité et Développement” with 
articles on G5 activities organized by the four departments. The official messaging in this 
publication fits with stated organizational objectives describing projects and programs in each of 
                                                          
19 Secrétariat Permanent du G5 Sahel, “Le G5 Sahel,” last modified 29 September 2015, 
https://www.g5sahel.org/qui-sommes-nous/le-g5-sahel. 
 
20 Permanent Secretariat Departments are: Resilience, Defense and Security, Infrastructure, and Governance. 
Secrétariat Permanent du G5 Sahel, last modified 15 October 2015, http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/qui-sommes-
nous/le-dispositif-de-pilotage-du-g5-sahel/le-secretariat-permanent-du-g5-sahel. 
 
21 Secrétariat Permanent du G5 Sahel, “Agir Ensemble pour le Contrôle des Espaces Frontaliers au Sahel,” 






the four departments and highlighting progress being made.22 An article within the periodical, 
attributes resilience of economic projects to foreign partners. It also describes a bilateral meeting 
between Niger and Chad for seven transborder development projects financed by the EU.23 The 
article is either crediting its external partners to appease them, or to draw attention to the 
commitment of external partners in the Sahel.   
EU objectives and conditions for intervention in the Sahel are outlined in several 
agreements predating the G5 Sahel, and mirror those communicated at the International High 
Level Conference on the Sahel in February of 2018. In 2007, the EU Directorate-General for 
External Policies developed the Joint-Africa EU Strategy. 24 It builds on the previous Cotonou 
Agreement from 2000 which linked development in Africa, within the Africa Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) region, to political stability and security. Article 1 promotes and expedites 
economic, cultural and social development in the ACP, whereas Article 11 attributes 
development to furthering peace and security, while promoting a stable and democratic political 
environment.25 The EU’s Action Plan for Support to Peace and Security in Africa specifically 
lays out criteria for the EU CSDP to conduct executive missions in Africa in the framework of 
African led or UN peacekeeping missions.26 Article 43 from the Lisbon Treaty provides the legal 
                                                          
22 G5 Sahel “Sécurité et Développement” Revue Semestrielle d’Information du G5 Sahel, no. 4, (February 2018), 1-
28, accessible at http://www.g5sahel.org/images/Docs/G5_SAHEL_revue_N4.pdf. 
  
23 G5 Sahel “Sécurité et Développement,” 23. 
 
24 Gloria Okemuo, “The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali the Consistency of the EU Africa policy” 
Liverpool Law Review, no. 34 (2013), 225. Accessible at DOI 10.1007/s10991-013-9139-7. 
 




26 Council of the European Union, Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa, Doc. 






framework that specifies reasons for CSDP external civilian and military operations for joint 
disarmament, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.27 Nearly all tasks can be applied to conditions in 
the Sahel and justify EU operations. 
In July, 2017 France and Germany established the Alliance for the Sahel to coordinate 
regional development cooperation.28 The Alliance for the Sahel is consistent with former 
external action policies towards Africa but lists goals specific to the Sahel. It takes the political 
stance of describing external action objectives in the Sahel as a European priority. The Alliance 
also lists those objectives which fall within the security, development and governance categories. 
Objectives for the Sahel are youth employment; rural development, agriculture and food 
security; climate, notably energy access, green energy and water; governance; support for return 
of basic services throughout the territory, including through decentralization; and security.29 The 
2018 International High Level Conference on the Sahel mobilized funding and commitment to 
the G5 Sahel echoing CSDP priorities for the region along three lines political support, financial 
assistance for security and coordination of development efforts.30   
                                                          
27 Okemuo, 227. 
 
28 European External Action Service, “Alliance for the Sahel will reinforce EU work for stability and development 




29 European Commission, “The EU’s Partnership for the Sahel,” 2018, accessible at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/the-eu-partnership-with-the-sahel_en.pdf 
 
30 European Commission: Press Release Database, “International High Level Conference on the Sahel” 23 February 







To illustrate how the programs materialize, EU reports describe activities linked to 
priorities. In Mali, the Youth and Stablilisation Programme restores and strengthens access to 
essential services. The associated joint security program aims at improving border security, 
internal security forces, and rule of law.31 The Hybrid Solar Centre in Niger, supporting 
sustainable development, is to increase power availability and create jobs. The Emergency 
Programme for the Sahel’s activities in northern Burkina Faso are for security and local 
governance with an accompanying undefined, social-economic development plan.32 There’s a 
designated border security program for Chad, and a rural development project for Mauritania to 
address food insecurity.33 The program descriptions are anecdotal and only a sampling of EU 
supported initiatives, but they nonetheless communicate tangible efforts. The linking of financial 
commitment and projects to specified objectives in the Sahel adds weight to the EU CSDP for 
the Sahel. 
The political objectives of SA and the UAE are less delineated. The Kingdom of SA and 
the UAE Foreign Affairs Ministries, the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) 
led by SA, and Arabic Development Agencies, are all players in the Sahel with possible political 
impact. Saudi development government agencies include the International Islamic Relief 
Organization, the International Muslim World League and the Saudi Fund for Development.34 
The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa and the Arab Organization for Agricultural 
Development directly supports the G5 Sahel. The new Saudi-Emirati political and military 
                                                          
31 European Commission, “The EU’s Partnership with the Sahel,” 23 February, 2018, accessed at       
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/the-eu-partnership-with-the-sahel_en.pdf. 
 
32 European Commission, “The EU’s Partnership with the Sahel.” 
 
33 European Commission, “The EU’s Partnership with the Sahel.” 







alliance is expected to supplant the GCC, weakened since relations soured with Qatar. Critics 
view the new alliance as consistent with a more active Saudi foreign policy to garner African 
support, indicated by its increased presence in the Sahel through military and development aid.35  
One apparent response to Saudi and Emirati political influence was the reaction of 
Sahelian states after the removal of Qatar from the GCC. In June 2017, SA and the UAE cut ties 
with Qatar because of its open support of Islamist political movements, and the its use of the Red 
Cross to supply and aid terrorist groups in Mali. In response, Chad and Mauritania also broke 
diplomatic ties with Qatar.36 The reactions of Chad and Mauritania were likely due to political 
pressure by SA and the UAE due to the timing of the decision and the GCC split. The most 
recent foreign policy shift is towards counter-terrorism. The UAE closely resembles the Saudi 
approach in economic partnerships, Wahhabi religious proselytization, and the recent investment 
in the G5 Sahel Joint Force.37 Since the Saudi-Emirati alliance does not have published 
objectives for relations with the Sahel, the IMCTC strategic objectives provide the security goals 
of SA and the UAE and are the most compatible for cross-regional comparison to EU goals for 
security. 
The IMCTC has six strategic objectives. The first is to strengthen the contribution of 
Islamic countries towards global security and peace. Second, is to reinforce solidarity and 
collaboration among coalition member countries to present a unified front against terrorist 
organizations. The third is to counter radical ideology in Coalition member countries through 
                                                          












strategic communication campaigns to refute the radical and extremist narratives and 
propaganda. Fourth, is reaffirm the moderate values of Islam and its principles of peace, 
tolerance and compassion. Fifth, is to combat terrorism financing (CTF) in collaboration with 
Coalition member countries and international CTF authorities, and promote compliance with 
international agreements and advance legal, regulatory, and operational frameworks. The last 
goal is to establish strategic partnerships between member countries, supporting nations and 
international organizations to share counter terrorism information and expertise.38 All objectives 
reference counter-terrorism, stability and collaboration.  
State sponsored development agencies are also part of the SA and the UAE’s strategy in 
the Sahel. SA founded the Islamic Relief Organization and the Muslim World League which 
have principles based on religious tenets. The Muslim World League has a charter with founding 
principles. The principles of the charter all appeal to the goal of unifying Muslims.39 
Additionally, it surveys mosques around the world to collect and publish religious data. While 
the mission of the Muslim World League is clearly religious direction under Saudi Wahhabi 
ideology, it does share the characteristic of collaboration and social justice found within the 
objectives of the G5 Sahel and EU Alliance for the Sahel. The Muslim World League 
publications and website do not offer information on development programs or activities by 
location, instead press releases make political statements supporting the Saudi position.40  
Additionally, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) acts in 
accordance with Saudi and Emirati foreign policy in West Africa. It has a mandate with three 
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objectives: participate in financing economic development in African countries, stimulate the 
contribution of Arab capital to African development, and provide the technical assistance 
required for the development of Africa.41 The bank’s coordinating group has five members that 
work on joint development projects and co-finance programs. Those relevant to this study 
include the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Gulf Program for UN 
Development Organizations (AGFUND), the Islamic Development Bank, and OPEC Fund for 
International Development (OFID), the last of which is supplemented by bilateral institutions 
including the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) and Saudi Fund for Development 
(SFD).42  
The bank funds development in four states of the G5, all except Mauritania. Investment 
and aid are for infrastructure, institutional support, health and social sectors.43 Although BADEA 
is a multinational banking institution, the heavy involvement of SA and the UAE make it a 
notable organization regarding their influence in the development domain of the Sahel. The 
ADFD includes in its strategy UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).  The SFD objectives 
are less value focused and address the means of development through loans, technical assistance, 
institutional support and guaranteeing national non-crude oil exports.44  The section on economic 
indicators will provide more information on development programs. The table below compiles 
published objectives of the three external partners compared with those of the G5 Sahel.  
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Table 1:  Comparison of Objectives 45 
Objectives G5 Sahel European Union Saudi Arabia & UAE 
Security 1. guarantee conditions for 
development and security 
of member states 
2. alliance of development 
and security 
1. Security in key areas such 
as migration, border 
management, youth, 
prevention of radicalization 
1. strengthen the contribution of 
Islamic countries towards global 
security 
2. counter radical ideology 
Governance 1. supported by democracy 
and good governance 
1. good governance * 
Civil Services 1. offer strategic leadership 
intervention in order to 
improve life conditions of 
civil populations 
1. energy access, and water 
2. support for return of basic 
services throughout the 
territory 
* 
Development 1. promote inclusive and 
durable regional 
development 
1. rural development, 
agriculture and food security 
2. sustainable development 
1. participate in financing 
economic development 
2. provide the technical 
assistance required for the 
development of Africa 
Regional 
Integration 
1. promote stability and 
cross-border cooperation 
1. reinforce solidarity and 
collaboration among coalition 
member countries 
2. establish strategic partnerships 
between member countries 
3. combat terrorism financing in 
collaboration with Coalition 
member countries 
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Comparing political objectives is straight-forward concerning the EU and G5 Sahel. Both 
organizations have official websites with listed goals for the region. There is remarkable overlap 
between their respective objectives. The overlap may be explained by the similar timeframe. The 
objectives of the G5 Sahel date back to 2014. Very similar objectives, or priority areas, were laid 
out during the 4th EU-Africa Summit in 2014.46 By 2017, the EU Alliance for the Sahel included 
all areas of the G5 Sahel objectives with the addition of youth employment.47 The coherence and 
timing of objectives could likely be the product of joint Africa-EU conferences. Although, 
principles of both sets of security and development objectives are largely international. UN 
SDGs have the same development goals, which also mention peace and stability. It is therefore 
difficult to determine how much the similarity is political influence by the EU, and not the 
international community at large.  
SA and the UAE required research into multiple domains for a comprehensive 
understanding of political goals and influence. Most notable here are the differences. There is no 
reference to governance or support to civil services as objectives. The two countries professed 
support to the G5 Sahel for security and development with a heavier emphasis on security 
through the IMCTC. The UAE does not have an independent set of objectives towards the Sahel. 
Instead, it is incorporated into several Gulf partnerships, which is why the IMCTC and BADEA 
objectives are equally applicable to the UAE and SA. Considering the principles set forth by the 
IMCTC concerning the Sahel, the counter-terrorism goals fit security objectives of the G5. There 
is less compatibility between the development objectives of the G5 and those listed by BADEA 
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and national Saudi and Emirati development agencies. The development principles from 
BADEA only discuss development broadly and mention providing technical assistance.48  
Evaluating political influence, the EU developed its objectives for the Sahel building off 
of existing partnerships with the Sahel, expanding from trade to development, and more recently 
including governance and security. The compatibility of objectives, several of which predate the 
G5 Sahel, make the EU a likely influencer in shaping G5 objectives. The EU and G5 objectives 
are taking on the character of international norms specifically adapting language used in the UN 
SDGs.  SA and the UAE are less interested in domestic management of resources, with technical 
assistance instead of sustainable development, and no reference to governance. One exception is 
the ADFD’s reference to UN SDGs in its strategy.  SA’s and the UAE’s political aims are not to 
adapt to G5 goals, but to pull the Sahel states further into its sphere of influence through its 
coalition. They cite pan-Islamic motivations for their expanding presence and development 
activities. SA uses the IMCTC platform to assume leadership in a new domain in the Gulf and 
project that image outward. In summary, EU influence is an extension from former ACP 
relations which emphasized political relations through trade and aid, to include sustainable 
development with an environmental focus, security and governance. SA and the UAE are 
strengthening relations with the G5 to bring the Sahel states into a closer alliance and expand 
their activities.  
 
Economic Indicators 
The motivation behind this study was interest in the high amount of investment pledged 
by the EU, SA and the UAE to the G5 Sahel in February 2018. Apart from direct investment in 
the G5, there are multiple additional sources of financing for the Sahel states. Member states of 
                                                          





the EU make bilateral contributions. Similarly, SA and the UAE invest in the member states of 
the Sahel individually as foreign direct investment, social and development funding.  Altogether, 
private commercial firms, NGOs, governmental and intergovernmental organizations are all 
sources of financing for the states of the G5 Sahel. This section will identify to the extent 
possible, the sources and amounts of funding to the member states of the G5 and the G5 itself, 
from the EU, SA and the UAE. Any type of funding to a state government from external actors 
has the potential to motivate national leaders and can therefore be influential. Funding source 
and purpose are important; and will be quantified for the three external actors by type (G5, 
bilateral) along with the sector funded.  
 To start with the source of initial interest, the International High Level Conference on the 
Sahel occurred 23 February 2018 with a 100 million euro pledge by the EU and SA, and 30 
million euro from the UAE to fund the G5 Sahel.49 The operating budget of the FC-G5S is 115 
million euro per year. 50 Effectively, the EU, SA and the UAE pledged enough at the Conference 
to fund two years of operations.  SA and the UAE are new security investors in the Sahel. The 
FC-G5S partnership is the first initiative of the IMCTC since its creation.51 As such, the outcome 
of that investment will be telling for Gulf partners. The EU on the other hand, funds three 
missions in the Sahel and contributes to the peacekeeping mission in Mali. The EU is indirectly 
supporting French military operations through the FC-G5S. The FC-G5S closely coordinates 
with French Operation Barkhane, and so funding the FC-G5S allows the French to delegate some 
responsibility to African partners.52  The growing economic investment in security with the 
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financing of the FC-G5S was the key outcome of the International High Level Conference on the 
Sahel. 
 Trade relations are of great importance to the Sahel’s external partners. Economic 
influence by means of trade arrangements is nothing new to the region. The EU maintains ACP 
privileged trade relations reaffirmed with the Cotonou Agreement, which includes Sahel states.53 
The ACP partnership allowed access to the common market, price protections, and a guaranteed 
European market for raw materials.54 It also created dependencies and a lack of economic 
diversification in ACP states. The 2000 Agreement maintains “trade for aid” but the 2010 
updates discuss gradual European market preference erosion to enable integration into the world 
economy.55 ACP relations are indeed transforming, but France especially ensures continued 
access to natural resources in the Sahel. Uranium is a key resource for French energy power from 
Niger, gold is the top resource in Mali, and the new petrol basin of Taoudeni located in northern 
Mali, is also of interest.56 Sahel resources will likely remain an important element of the EU-
Sahelian relationship. Additionally, the EU is the largest contributor of financial aid in the 
region. Most recently, in December 2018 the EU added 125 million euro for security and 
development programs to the four billion euros already committed for the 2014 to 2020 time 
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period for the five Sahel states.57 Development is a key aspect of the EU-Sahel relationship. The 
enormous amount of funding is often aligned with conditions for improving governance, 
integrating into the world market, and stability.58 The conditionality is a manner of influence, for 
Sahel states to implement development funds, they have to make progress towards governance 
and development goals agreed with the EU.  
The Gulf states are also interested in maintaining trade deals with the Sahel and over the 
last ten years they have strengthened economic ties. The UAE alone is now home to more than 
10,000 African companies.59 Africa provides an enticing market for the Gulf states to diversify 
their oil-based economies. The UAE is investing heavily in telecommunications contracts in the 
Sahel, whereas SA is investing in agriculture in Mauritania, utilizing the sparse arable land.60 
Throughout North and West Africa, Gulf investment is in the form of real estate.61 The two Gulf 
partners are becoming competitive in securing influence through trade, described as playing the 
role of gatekeepers for Africa’s rising economies.62 However, in the Sahel states trade 
contributions by SA and the UAE remain far behind the EU.63  
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Saudi and Emirati banks are active in the region. The line is sometimes blurred between 
national bank and development agency as “aid” which is most often in the form of loans. For 
example, the UAE’s ADFD invested 59.9 million dollars in Niger for electricity and water 
projects but, all in the form of loans.64 Burkina Faso is a very similar case. Yet in Mali, it is a 
much higher amount; 294 million dollars in total aid, of which 263 million are loans.65 
Concerning actual development programs in the Sahel, the ADFD announced a new initiative in 
Chad in December 2018 for water accessibility, livestock and agricultural projects.  Additional 
Sahel projects are for infrastructure in Mali constructing dams, similar dam projects in Burkina 
Faso plus a solar energy project, and a dam and electrical power project in Niger.66 SA’s 
development spending in the Sahel states is all in the form of loans.67 In 2016, SA awarded a 
loan to Chad for vocational education amounting to 30 million dollars and 50 million dollars to 
Mauritania.68 The SFD website lists projects by country covering health, education, 
infrastructure and food security in Niger, infrastructure, agricultural and livestock projects in 
Mali, 11 infrastructure projects in Burkina Faso, and water distribution, education, mining and 
infrastructure projects in Mauritania.69 Economically, through loans for development, trade, and 
security partnerships, SA and the UAE are expanding their presence in the Sahel states. 
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To compare the economic impact of SA with the UAE and the EU, Table 2 below tallies 
up the amounts of economic contributions to the Sahel member states and the G5 Sahel since 
2014 and projected through 2020. Important to note, the EU contributions do not include 
separate bilateral contributions from individual EU Member states, which is approximately four 
billion euro during the same time period.70 Separate contributions by EU member states were not 
included to keep the integrity of presenting the EU as a unique regional entity.  Also excluded 
are Emirati and Saudi development contributions through regional and international development 
agencies such as OFID. 
 
Table 2: Economic Contribution Summary Table 71 
Sector EU UAE SA 
G5 Sahel 100.0 million EUR 30.0 million EUR 100.0 million EUR 
Development Aid 3,811.5 million EUR 80.6 million EUR * 
Loans 257.6 million EUR 376.2 million EUR 963.0 million EUR 
Total 4,169.1 million EUR 486.8 million EUR 1,063.0 million EUR 
 
 
In Table 2, contributions to the Sahel includes development aid for multiple programs, 
loans and separate funding to the G5 Sahel. The EU’s Regional Indicative Program (RIP) is for 
trade and development in the five Sahelian states. It is for further integration into the world 
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market in partnership with ECOWAS. RIP “aims to strengthen regional integration notably by 
boosting trade relations between countries in the sub-region and between the EU and the sub-
region. This should enable the West African region (WAEMU and ECOWAS) to increase its 
trading activities in the region.”72 RIP funding for the Sahel is divided into several categories 
with different purposes. The European Development Fund is makes up the largest component of 
RIP and supports health, food security, agriculture, water, and sustainable health initiatives. The 
Emergency Trust fund for Africa is for regional projects, loans (or loan-grant blending 
mechanisms) are for infrastructure projects, and humanitarian aid makes up the final category. 73 
From the collated data, the UAE and SA are far behind the EU when it comes to 
development and trade contributions. In 2018, the EU remains the region’s largest trade partner 
at 28.5 percent of total trade, the UAE was the tenth trading partner at 1.5 percent.74 However, 
for the G5 Sahel organization, SA and the EU are on equal footing, and the addition of the UAE 
pledge puts the SA and the UAE ahead in organizational funding. Figure 1 below is the graphical 
depiction of the combined development aid and loan contributions to the five Sahel states 
comparing the EU with the two Arab Gulf states.75 Figure 2 depicts separate organizational 
funding to the G5 Sahel.76   
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 In terms of economic support, there is no question that the EU contributes the most to the 
Sahelian states. The EU member states also match the EU institutional contributions reported 
here in development financing.77 If taken into account, the EU and its member states’ separate 
contributions come to approximately eight billion euro, which is over four times that of SA and 
the UAE combined.  However, the increase in trade and counter-terror financing from SA and 
the UAE is also relevant to note. SA is now an equal contender with the EU in G5 Sahel support. 
Since they both have an equal stake in the organization’s investment, that gives the G5 multiple 
external partners of significance. The governments of the five states likewise depend on 
development and “aid for trade” funding to run their administration and provide essential 
services.78 Both avenues of funding to the G5 organization and to its member states are relevant. 
Another indicator of direct economic influence is the oversight committee designed to monitor 
G5 funds.79 The oversight committee would be answerable to external partner financiers, which 
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Figure 2: Contribution 






naturally, gives them a level of organizational control if they choose to oppose how funds are 
employed.  
To conclude, the data from the economic indicators points to the EU as having the most 
potential influence, with the emerging SA and UAE as new actors of interest. The EU commits 
most to development and trade, whereas SA and the UAE are contributing to security financing, 
and loan investments. The trade partnership and the amount of development financing reveals a 
steady commitment from the EU. Since the G5 Sahel as an organization cannot be separated 
from its member states, their financial dependence on the EU should not be discounted in how 
they direct the G5. SA and the UAE are taking up an interest in the G5 Sahel, and if treated as a 
forerunner of a more assertive foreign policy, more investment will likely follow.   
 
Security Indicators 
 The G5 Sahel started out as a regional political organization for cooperation, 
development and security. Early on, more emphasis was placed on governance and development. 
Now with the creation of the FC-G5S in 2017, and the funding that came pouring in from 
external partners, security operations captured international attention surrounding the G5. 
International partners identified security concerns in the Sahel region since the early 2000s, 
augmented by the crisis in Mali in 2012. The security response continues to grow with external 
partners worried about spillover effects.80 Spillover within the Sahel as militant groups disperse 
to recruit and find safe haven in remote border regions. Spillover beyond the Sahel to Europe 
includes human, arms, and drug trafficking which often finance conflict. Years after the initial 
military intervention in Mali, the MINUSMA mission stagnates without tangible progress, as 
                                                          






peace agreements fail and violence against peacekeepers continues. Meanwhile, the Lake Chad 
Basin is affronted by the Boko Haram conflict. The limitations of the affected states, and 
multilateral missions, drove the demand for a greater security focus by the G5.  
Hard power has a tendency towards overuse by the governments of the Sahel, something 
in common with sub-Saharan Africa in general. The prevalence of military coups and the close 
relationship between political power and a strong security apparatus in the Sahelian member 
states, make hard power initiatives easy to criticize. However, the rise of non-state militant 
groups with connections to terrorist organizations was the justification for foreign interventions 
that opened the door to hard power solutions. International organizations, the US, the French, the 
EU and now the IMCTC, are all involved in military operations to address insecurity in the 
Sahel. The G5 Sahel presents the opportunity for a Sahelian led force, which is preferred 
politically by external partners. Propping up the security apparatus of the G5 can be a short-term 
means of influence, or a continued security partnership can yield long-term influence.   
Security indicators include influence through training, conducting joint patrols, and 
equipping the FC-G5S. Indicators also include military and policing presence in the G5 states for 
coordinating military operations. Cooperation with existing security operations is a part of the 
FC-G5S mandate.81 There is an inherent degree of influence from the actors guiding the 
enduring security operations. As long as they continue, the FC-G5S will have a supporting role. 
For direct involvement with the FC-G5S, the greater the foreign presence and longer the 
duration, the more influence is expected. Additionally, if operations depend on equipment and 
specific training to operate, the provider is likewise expected to exert more influence.    
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 For Europe, the Sahel is of particular interest for domestic security. Germany and France 
consider the Sahel to be a potential base for terrorists to train and plan attacks in Europe.82 Since 
the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) of 2007, there is ever increasing emphasis on defense and 
security operations. It opened the door to the three current EU missions in the Sahel. The EU is 
engaged in two civilian and one military mission.83 The longest duration is the EU Capacity 
Building Mission, EUCAP Sahel Niger, since 2012. EUCAP Sahel Niger’s purpose is to train 
and support Nigerien authorities for counter-terrorism and crime prevention.84 The civilian 
mission has as much a focus on governance as on security. Successful counter-terrorism and 
crime prevention depend on the judicial system, anti-corruption measures, and effective 
intelligence and information management. To support the mission, the EU keeps security and 
legal experts stationed in Niamey, Niger.  The experts engage in train the trainer programs, with 
internal Nigerien security forces, the Nigerien Army, and judicial authorities. 85 The civilian 
mission has a transnational focus targeting trafficking and militant facilitation networks and 
containing migration, which ultimately benefits the EU. It is a product of the EU’s Strategy for 
Security and Development in the Sahel published in 2011.86 The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian 
mission is one of the external missions with which the G5 Sahel is expected to coordinate. The 
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transnational nature of the mission and the purpose of the EUCAP Sahel Niger, closely resemble 
that of the FC-G5S, which could indicate EU influence on the Sahel Force in setting its agenda.  
The EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali supports the French Operation Barkhane and 
the UN MINUSMA mission since 2013. EUCAP Sahel Mali is an accompanying civilian 
mission. While civilian missions still involve training of security forces, and the EUCAP Mali 
mission “provides experts in strategic advice and training to the Malian Police, Gendarmerie, 
National Guard and the relevant ministries in order to support reform in the security sector.”87 It 
addresses all sectors of internal security, implying both reorganization of the administrations and 
anti-corruption measures. The renewed mandate extends the mission until 2021 and includes 
instructions for inter-operability and coordination with G5 Sahel countries.88 EUTM Mali is 
similar in that it is a train and advise mission that does not participate in combat. An interesting 
stipulation in the EUTM’s mission statement is to train and operationalize the G5 Sahel Joint 
Force. EUTM is therefore taking responsibility for the preparation and action of the FC-G5S. 
The inclusion of the FC-G5S in the EUTM strategic objectives is an assertion of influence, as it 
seeks to prepare the FC-G5S to share its mission. The EU renewed mandates for the three 
missions, and at this point they can be considered long-term. They will likely remain a means of 
influence through the commitment set with the G5 Sahel. The summary table below consolidates 
the three EU missions in the region presenting the sectors that they support. All missions either 
coordinate with the G5 Sahel or train the FC-G5S.  
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Table 3: EU Missions in the Sahel 89 
Mission  Start  Provides: Sectors Supported: 
Training Facilities Police Intelligence Legal Military Government 
EUTM (Mali) 2013 yes yes yes no no yes yes 
EUCAP Sahel Mali 2015 yes yes yes no yes no yes 
EUCAP Sahel Niger 2012 yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
  
 SA and the UAE see security in the Sahel as an opportunity to engage the G5 and forge a 
positive reputation for their regional security organization. Specifically, they are increasing their 
involvement with the FC-G5S through the IMCTC. Prior to 2015, SA and the UAE were 
involved only in trade and development through banks and religious based social projects. The 
emergence of the IMCTC occurred as GCC cohesion crumbled. The IMCTC is a political-
military alliance of 40 Islamic countries that includes all G5 member states.90 Although the 
IMCTC is a multinational organization, it was founded under Saudi leadership and continues to 
be a project guided by the Kingdom. The IMCTC claims four domains for its activities: 
ideology, communications, CTF, and Military.91 The ideology component includes “to align and 
correct the understanding of religious principles”92 in its objectives which is consistent with the 
Saudi assertion of religious authority on Islam and underlines SA’s role as leader of the IMCTC. 
The initiative with the FC-G5S is the first IMCTC endeavor since its creation. The FC-G5S 
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provides an opportunity for the new Saudi led coalition to operationalize and project its influence 
abroad.93  
SA and the UAE are implementing the bulk of pledged G5 funds through the IMCTC 
which manages the dispersion of funds instead of the G5 Sahel itself. The IMCTC keeping the 
control of funds means less autonomy for the G5 organization and more G5 member state 
participation in the IMCTC. Earmarked funds are for hard power application specifically, 
logistics, training, intelligence and air support.94 The direct investment in the tangible 
capabilities of the FC-G5S, provides the operational resources for it to function, and fits the 
expectation for short-term influence on security activities of the G5. So far, there is no published 
plan on what IMCTC, Sahel G5 cooperation will look like beyond FC-G5S capacity building. 
The UAE is similarly investing in the security capabilities of G5 member states. For example, in 
Mauritania it has projects for a “School of War” military training center.95 The emphasis of SA 
and the UAE on the security functions of the G5 increases the FC-G5S operational budget. It will 
also give the Sahel states another external partner with funding available, willing to prove the 
capabilities of the nascent IMCTC for international credibility.  
 In determining overall influence on security for the G5 Sahel, the EU is the partner in the 
lead. The EU has an established, well-funded presence through its missions with UN and African 
partner backing. The EUTM even has the mission to train and operationalize the FC-G5S as part 
of its mandate.  It is clear that the EU is a strong proponent of the Joint Force and has even taken 
some responsibility for it. The FC-G5S is an integrated part of the EU security plan for the Sahel, 
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in the hopes of transitioning the EU mission to Sahelian partners.96 It has already invested 
heavily in the security of the region with the three active missions. A strong FC-G5S would 
allow the EU to highlight the success of its African regional partnership while still seeing to its 
own security concerns. The EU provides non-lethal equipment, and while it does not conduct 
combat operations nor joint patrols, it trains police and military forces to perform the functions 
of its missions.  The FC-G5S is also committed to coordinate with the EU missions, a sign of 
enduring influence. Although not as evident, the influence of Saudi and Emirati partners is not to 
be discounted. SA and the UAE’s presence in the security domain are still new, and they are 
gaining traction. They provide equipment for the FC-G5S, and also support bilateral security 
programs with G5 member states. The IMCTC is an important initiative to follow because the 
G5 Sahel represents both Coalition members and its pilot project. If the G5 makes progress with 
the amount of investment by SA and the UAE, it is likely that both their security presence and 
influence will grow in the region. 
 
Conclusion 
Europe, the Arabian Gulf and the West African Sahel come from very different 
geopolitical positions. Their histories, capabilities, geostrategic positions, and economic 
circumstances all vary as do their relationships. To compare and assess the influence of these 
external partners on the G5 regional organization, political, economic and security areas were 
evaluated. Social influence was excluded from this study due to a perceived shortage of 
academic material for social indicator research and comparison. Nonetheless, cultural ties to the 
Arabian Gulf, educational exchanges, NGO social and religious activities have a 
                                                          






transformational impact on communities in the Sahel and merit further study. Gulf sponsored 
religious centers introduced a Wahhabi interpretation that conflicts with indigenous Sufi 
practices.97 At the same time, the vestiges of colonial influence from France are diminishing and 
at times actively rejected. One example of this cultural shift is the changing of official language 
from French to Arabic by government ministries in Mauritania.98 Meager anecdotal evidence 
was not sufficient for developing and analyzing social indicators, such an undertaking deserves a 
future research project. 
The conclusion from the data analysis determines that overall the EU is the most 
influential when considering the results of political, economic and security indicators. The EU’s 
transparency in its agreements with G5 member states, its commitments and missions in the 
region facilitated data compilation. Conversely, SA and the UAE do not have consolidated 
platforms explaining their agreements, commitments and missions. Official statements, 
governmental and nongovernmental sources provided the information for the indicators, but it is 
possible that there is missing applicable information. The G5 Sahel regional organization is still 
organizing, program funding is still materializing, and programs are not succinctly defined, 
which provided a challenge to evaluating external influence. The political indicators relied on 
published objectives and diplomatic statements. The comparison in Table 1 shows near perfect 
alignment between EU and G5 Sahel objectives. The similar timing of the EU and G5 Sahel’s 
definition of objectives and the EU-Africa Summit all in 2014 makes influence likely, although it 
is difficult to determine if influence was one directional. The table also shows a relevant gap in 
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Saudi and Emirati objectives concerning governance and civil services. Their absence 
illuminates another key difference between the partners, the EU applies conditionality in its 
assistance for progress towards good governance while the two Gulf states do not. The inclusion 
of the IMCTC and regional Gulf development organizations looked beyond the governments to 
the activities they sponsor to provide a holistic picture of SA and the UAE political objectives. 
The results identify areas of apparent compatibility with the G5, but not in all categories, and not 
to the extent of the EU.   
Economic support has a strong potential to influence the G5 because of its dependence on 
external partners. Financiers can direct how funds are spent, giving them a position of control 
over the organization and its activities. One such mechanism is the oversight committee for 
management of funds earmarked by partners. Actual direct funding of the G5 was the start of the 
economic comparison, but the contribution of development agencies, trade contributions and 
foreign direct investment in the Sahel region, are equally important when measuring external 
influence impacting the G5. Concerning the pledged financial commitment to the G5 Sahel, SA 
and the UAE together surmount the EU. However, when adding additional funding through 
development and security programs, the EU contributes far more than Gulf external partners. 
The UAE and SA contributions are still significant and may in fact grow, if the IMCTC 
intervention is determined a success.   
 The last area of comparative analysis was the security domain. The G5 Sahel 
organization started with a focus on development as a means to combat insecurity, but in the 
years following, the organization shifted more towards the security interests of its international 
partners.99 Security interests are now forefront in both G5 operations and international attention.  
                                                          






The EU Alliance for the Sahel asserts that security, stability and development in the Sahel are 
first in the interest of Africans, but also in the interest of Europeans.100  The extent of its security 
and defense related activities in the Sahel make it the primary external partner. The EU is 
concerned with irregular migration and to that purpose, invests funds and personnel for 
stabilization and development in the Sahel. The longevity of the three active missions show the 
level of EU commitment. However, there is political will to transition security responsibility to 
the G5 Sahel apparent in the EUTM mandate and in that case, one can expect EU influence to 
diminish. Saudi and Emirati security intentions are to empower the IMCTC. SA is staking its 
image on the new Coalition as its creator, and the UAE is a prominent supporter as well. The 
Sahel is the first area of engagement for the IMCTC. For SA to keep up its new self-asserted role 
in counter-terrorism and Islamic leadership, it wants to have a favorable effect on the FC-G5S 
which can motivate further involvement. 
 The sustained position of the EU as an external influencer in the Sahel helps explain its 
relationship with the G5 organization. The G5 Sahel is dependent on all external partners for 
funding, but the EU outstrips all other actors in the amount of support to G5 member states. 
Political and security imperatives are also relevant. Europe wants to maintain its geopolitical 
position in the region while eventually drawing down its commitments to actual missions. The 
FC-G5S is postured to enable the EU to achieve that end.  The EU seeks to influence the Sahel 
for two primary purposes, to curb irregular migration in the short-term, and support French 
regional interests in the long-term. The Sahel is both an area of origin and transit for migrants. 
The growing security emphasis of EU missions is on border security and countering trafficking, 
the development and governance goals remediate emigration “push” factors.  The EU explicitly 
                                                          





added the objective to counter irregular migration to the mission mandates in 2015.101 The 
process of French foreign policy shaping EU policy in West Africa is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, the overlap between French and EU operations is relevant. EU CSDP supports 
French Operation Barkhane. France initiates EU partnerships with the Sahel, dating back to the 
start of ACP trade relations and continuing to the EU Alliance for the Sahel in 2017. The EU 
provides France a multilateral platform to protect its political and economic interests while 
avoiding appearances of neo-colonialism.     
  SA and the UAE are rising partners. They have a cultural tie to the region that may 
support greater political influence. SA and the UAE see the G5 Sahel as an opportunity to 
strengthen ties with the region and project an image of responsible global leadership. The 
IMCTC allows SA to place itself at the head as first among equals. The goals of the IMCTC 
defend the assertion of Gulf religious authority, while also stipulating that intervention requires 
members’ invitation giving it a cooperative approach.102 The increased involvement of SA and 
the UAE in political and security domains affirms growing Gulf leadership in developing 
countries. They have the political will and financial ability to be alternatives to competing 
external actors. The next five years may see geostrategic re-posturing in the Sahel. The G5 Sahel 
itself may become a stronger independent regional power.  However, that can only occur after 
the G5 assumes mission control and can sustain its operations. This study serves as an initial 
analysis of Gulf and European influence over the G5. 
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